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VIRGINIA
Crutchfield v. State Water Control Bd., 612 S.E.2d 249 (Va. Ct. App.
2005) (affirming the trial court's approval of the State Water Control
Board's decision to issue an effluent discharge permit to Hanover
County, Virginia because state law dictates deferential treatment of
agency decisions when supported by substantial evidence in the record).
In 1997, Hanover County in Virginia ("County") applied for a Virginia Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("VPDES") permit to
discharge treated wastewater into the Pamunkey River.
Frances
Broaddus Crutchfield and Henry Ruffin Broaddus (collectively
"Crutchfield") owned a farm along the Pamunkey River where the discharge would occur under the permit. Crutchfield and others opposed the permit during the public hearing held by the State Water
Control Board ("SWCB"). On April 28, 1999 the SWCB approved the
County's VPDES permit. Crutchfield appealed the SWCB decision to
the Circuit Court, City of Richmond. The trial court found the SWCB
properly issued the permit, and Crutchfield appealed again to the
Court of Appeals of Virginia, Alexandria.
On appeal, Crutchfield argued the trial court improperly affirmed
the SWCB's decision to approve the permit because: (1) the record did
not contain substantial evidence the effluent discharge would not further degrade the water quality, and (2) state statute requires the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality ("VDEQ") to perform a
load allocation prior to permit issuance to determine if the river can
support new discharges if the water segment already does not meet
water quality standards.
The court found the record did contain substantial evidence to
support the VPDES permit approval. Since established state law principles required deference to agency decisions, the court reasoned the
numerous technical reports, consultation with other state and federal
agencies, issuance of stricter permit requirements in response to public
comments, and additional scientific evidence in the agency record established substantial evidence to support the agency's decision. Specifically, the court noted the technical reports indicated the effluent
restrictions placed on the permit were "self-sustaining."
In other
words, the discharges into the river would not exceed water quality
standards even if the river contained only effluent. The court also refused to consider new evidence introduced by Crutchfield during the
appeal. The Virginia Administrative Procedure Act only allows supplementation of the record when no record exists. Here, a sufficient
agency record already existed.
Next, the court agreed with the trial court's interpretation of
VPDES regulations concerning the permitting process. The VPDES
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regulation required a permittee seeking a permit for a water segment
that does not already meet water quality standards to show the segment
could support additional effluent based on a VDEQ load allocation.
Crutchfield argued the regulation required a VDEQ load allocation
prior to permit issuance. The court reasoned the permitting process
did not trigger this provision merely because the Pamunkey River did
not meet water quality standards at the time of permit issuance. Instead, the court found the VDEQ could only trigger this provision if
they perform the load allocation first, and the regulations did not require the VDEQ to perform the load allocation. Here, the record did
not show any load allocation by the VDEQ. Therefore, the court decided the VDEQ did not trigger the provision.
In conclusion, by deferring to the agency decision-making process,
the court affirmed the trial court's findings that the record contained
substantial evidence to support the VPDES permit issuance, and regulations governing the permit application process do not require the
VDEQ to perform a load allocation prior to permit approval.
David B. Oakley

WASHINGTON
Nelson v. Shorewood Hills Homeowners Assoc., No. 53891-8-I, 2005
Wash. App. LEXIS 1573 (Wash. Ct. App. Jul. 5, 2005) (holding adjacent property owners did not violate the surface water common enemy
doctrine by paving and grading their property).
Homeowners in Shorewood Hills, a private housing community,
sued Shorewood Hills Homeowners Association (the "Association") for
damages stemming from a severely eroded ravine adjacent to their
property. In turn, the Association sued the City of Shoreline (the
"City") and Shoreline Community College (the "College") as third
party defendants for contribution. The Superior Court of King County
denied the Association's motion for summary judgment and granted
the City and College's motion. The Association appealed to the Court
of Appeals of Washington, Division One.
The Association first asserted that the City and College were liable
because they trespassed by water by overburdening an easement and
their actions did not fall under any of the exceptions to the common
enemy doctrine. The common enemy doctrine has been the foundation of surface water law in Washington since 1896. This doctrine
states that landowners may use any means to protect their land from
unwanted surface water without incurring liability to neighboring
landowners. The doctrine has three exceptions: (1) landowners may
not inhibit the flow of a natural watercourse; (2) landowners may not
collect, channel, and thrust water, whether by gutter, culvert, street, or

